SourceFinder: Finding Malware Source-Code from Publicly Available
  Repositories by Rokon, Md Omar Faruk et al.
SourceFinder: Finding Malware Source-Code from Publicly Available
Repositories
Md Omar Faruk Rokon
CS, UCR
mroko001@ucr.edu
Risul Islam
CS, UCR
risla002@ucr.edu
Ahmad Darki
CS,UCR
adark001@ucr.edu
Vagelis E. Papalexakis
CS,UCR
epapalex@cs.ucr.edu
Michalis Faloutsos
CS,UCR
michalis@cs.ucr.edu
Abstract
Where can we find malware source code? This question is
motivated by a real need: there is a dearth of malware source
code, which impedes various types of security research. Our
work is driven by the following insight: public archives, like
GitHub, have a surprising number of malware repositories.
Capitalizing on this opportunity, we propose, SourceFinder,
a supervised-learning approach to identify repositories of
malware source code efficiently. We evaluate and apply our
approach using 97K repositories from GitHub. First, we show
that our approach identifies malware repositories with 89%
precision and 86% recall using a labeled dataset. Second, we
use SourceFinder to identify 7504 malware source code repos-
itories, which arguably constitutes the largest malware source
code database. Finally, we study the fundamental properties
and trends of the malware repositories and their authors. The
number of such repositories appears to be growing by an order
of magnitude every 4 years, and 18 malware authors seem
to be “professionals" with well-established online reputation.
We argue that our approach and our large repository of mal-
ware source code can be a catalyst for research studies, which
are currently not possible.
1 Introduction
Security research could greatly benefit by an extensive
database of malware source code, which is currently unavail-
able. This is the assertion that motivates this work. First,
security researchers can use malware source code to: (a) un-
derstand malware behavior and techniques, and (b) evaluate
security methods and tools [21, 30]. In the latter, having the
source code can provide the groundtruth for assessing the
effectiveness of different techniques, such as reverse engi-
neering methods [11, 27, 56] and anti-virus methods. Second,
currently, a malware source code database is not readily avail-
able. By contrast, there are several databases with malware
binary code, as collected via honeypots, but even those are
often limited in number and not widely available. We discuss
existing malware archives in Section 9.
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Figure 1: Starting from 32M GitHub repositories, we find
7.5K malware source code repositories using 137 malware
keywords (Q137).
A missed opportunity: Surprisingly, software archives,
like GitHub, host many publicly-accessible malware reposi-
tories, but this has not yet been explored to provide security
researchers with malware source code for their studies. In
this work, we focus on GitHub which is arguably the largest
software storing and sharing platform. As of October 2019,
GitHub reports more than 34 million users [24] and more
than 32 million public repositories [23]. As we will see later,
there are thousands of repositories that have malware source
code, which seem to have escaped the radar of the research
community so far.
Why do authors create public malware repositories? This
question mystified us: these repositories expose both the cre-
ators and the intelligence behind the malware. Intrigued, we
conducted a small investigation on malware authors, as we
discuss below.
Problem: How can we find malware source code reposito-
ries in a large archive, like GitHub? The input to the problem
is an online archive and the desired output is a database of
malware repositories. The challenges include: (a) collecting
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an appropriate set of repositories from the potentially vast
archive, (b) identifying the repositories that contain malware.
Optionally, we also want to further help researchers that will
potentially use these repositories, by determining additional
properties, such as the most likely target platform, the mal-
ware type or family etc. Another practical challenge is the
need to create the ground truth for validation purposes.
Related work: To the best of our knowledge, there does
not seem to be any studies focusing on the problem above.
We group related works in the following categories. First,
several studies analyze software repositories to find usage
and limitations without any focus on malware [14]. Second,
several efforts maintain databases of malware binaries but
without source code [2, 3]. Third, many efforts attempt to ex-
tract higher-level information from binaries, such as lifting to
Intermediate Representation(IR) [19], but it is really difficult
to re-create the source code [10]. In fact, such studies would
benefit from our malware source-code archive to evaluate and
improve their methods. Taking a software engineering angle,
an interesting work [8] compares the evolution of 150 mal-
ware source code repositories with that of benign software.
We discuss related works in Section 9.
Contributions: Our work is arguably the first to system-
atically identify malware source code repositories from a
massive public archive. The contribution of this work is three-
fold: (a) we propose SourceFinder, a systematic approach
to identify malware source-code repositories with high pre-
cision, (b) we create, arguably, the largest non-commercial
malware source code archive with 7504 repositories, and (c)
we study patterns and trends of the repository ecosystem in-
cluding temporal and author-centric properties and behaviors.
We apply and evaluate our method on the GitHub archive,
though it could also be used on other archives, as we discuss
in Section 8.
Our key results can be summarized in the following points,
and some key numbers are shown in Figure 1.
a. We collect 97K malware-related repositories from
GitHub. In the collection, we overcome various practical
limitations, and we also generate an extensive groundtruth
with 2013 repositories, as we explain in Section 3.
b. SourceFinder achieves 89% precision. We systemati-
cally consider different Machine Learning approaches, and
carefully-created representations for the different fields of the
repository, such as title, description etc. We then systemati-
cally evaluate the effect of the different features, as we discuss
in Section 5. We show that we classify malware repositories
with a 89% precision, 86% recall and 87% F1-score using
five fields from the repository.
c. We identify 7504 malware source-code repositories,
which is arguably the largest malware source-code database
in the research community. We have already downloaded
the contents in these repositories, in case GitHub decides to
deactivate them. We also created a curated database of 250
malware repositories manually verified and spanning a wide
range of malware types. Naturally, we intend to make our
datasets available for research purposes.
d. The number of new malware repositories in our data
more than triples every four years. The increasing trend is
interesting and alarming at the same time.
e. We identify popular and influential repositories. We
identify the malware repositories using three metrics of pop-
ularity: the number of watchers, forks and stars. We find 8
repositories that dominate the top-5 lists of all three metrics.
f. We identify prolific and influential authors. We find
that 3% of the authors have more than 300 followers. We
also find that 0.2% of the authors have more than 7 malware
repositories, with the most prolific author cyberthreats having
created 336 repositories.
g. We identify and profile 18 professional hackers. We
find 18 authors of malware repositories, who seem to have
created a brand around their activities, as they use the same
user names in security forums. For example, user 3vilp4wn
(pronounced evil-pawn) is the author of a keylogger malware
in GitHub, which the author is promoting in the Hack This
Site forum using the same username. We present our study of
malware authors in Section 7.
Open-sourcing for maximal impact: creating an en-
gaged community. We intend to make our datasets and our
tools available for research purposes. Our vision is to create
community-driven reference center, which will provide: (a)
malware source code repositories, (b) community-vetted la-
bels and feedback, and (c) open-source tools for collecting
and analyzing malware repositories. Our goal is to expand
our database with more software archives. Although authors
could start hiding their repositories (see Section 8), we ar-
gue that our already-retrieved database could have significant
impact in enabling certain types of research studies.
2 Background
We provide background information on GitHub and the type
of information that repositories have.
GitHub is a massive world-wide software archive, which
enables users to share code through its public repositories thus
creating a global social network of interaction. For instance,
first, users can collaborate on a repository. Second, users
often "fork" projects: they copy and evolve projects. Third,
users can follow projects, and "up-vote" projects using "stars"
(think Facebook likes). Although GitHub has many private
repositories, there are 32 million public software repositories.
We describe the key elements of a GitHub repository. A
repository is equivalent to a project folder, and typically, each
repository corresponds to a single software project.
A repository in GitHub has the following data fields: a) title,
b) description, c) topics, d) README file, e) file and folders,
f) date of creation and last modified, g) forks, h) watchers,
i) stars, and j) followers and followings, which we explain
below.
1. Repository title: The title is a mandatory field and it
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usually consists of less than 3 words.
2. Repository description: This is an optional field that
describes the objective of the project and it is usually 1-2
sentences long.
3. Repository topics: An author can optionally provide
topics for her repository, in the form of tags, for example,
“linux, malware, malware-analysis, anti-virus". Note that 97%
of the repositories in our dataset have less than 8 topics.
4. README file: As expected, the README file is a
documentation and/or light manual for the repository. This
field is optional and its size varies from one or two sentences
to many paragraphs. For example, we found that 17.48% of
the README files in our repositories are empty.
5. File and folders: In a well-constructed software, the
file and folder names of the source code can provide useful
information. For example, some malware repositories contain
files or folders with indicative names, such as “malware",
”source code" or even specific malware types or names of
specific malware, like mirai.
6. Date of creation and last modification: GitHub main-
tains the date of creation and last modification of a repository.
We find malware repository created in 2008 are actively being
modified by authors till present.
7. Number of forks: Users can fork a public repository:
they can create a clone of the project [31]. An user can fork
any public repository to change locally and contribute to the
original project if the owner accepts the modification. The
number of forks is an indication of the popularity and impact
of a repository. Note that the number of forks indicates the
number of distinct users that have forked a repository.
8. Number of watchers: Watching a repository is equiva-
lent to “following" in the social media language. A “watcher"
will get notifications, if there is any new activity in that project.
The numbers of watchers is an indication of the popularity of
a repository [16].
9. Number of stars: A user can “star" a repository, which
is equivalent to the “like" function in social media [5], and
places the repository in the users favorite group, but does not
provide constant updates as with the “watching" function.
10. Followers: Users can also follow other users’ work.
If A follows B, A will be added to B’s followers and B will
be added to A’s following list. The number of followers is an
indication of the popularity of a user [38].
3 Data Collection
The first step in our work is to collect repositories from
GitHub that have a higher chance of being related to malware.
Extracting repositories at scale from GitHub hides several
subtleties and challenges, which we discuss below.
Using the GitHub Search API, a user can query with a set
of keywords and obtain the most relevant repositories. We
describe briefly how we select appropriate keywords, retrieve
related repositories from GitHub and how we establish our
ground truth.
Set Descriptions Size
Q1 Query set = {"malware"} 1
Q50 Query with 50 keywords with Q1⊂Q50 50
Q137 Query with 137 keywords with Q50⊂Q137 137
RD1 Retrieved repositories from query Q1 2775
RD50 Retrieved repositories from query Q50 14332
RD137 Retrieved repositories from query Q137 97375
LD1 Labeled subset of RD1 dataset 379
LD50 Labeled subset of RD50 dataset 755
LD137 Labeled subset of RD137 dataset 879
M1 Malware source code repositories in RD1 680
M50 Malware source code repositories in RD50 3096
M137 Malware source code repositories in RD137 7504
MCur Manually verified malware source code
dataset
250
Table 1: Datasets, their relationships, and their size.
A. Selecting keywords for querying: In this step, we
want to retrieve repositories from GitHub in a way that: (a)
provides as many as possible malware repositories, and (b)
provides a wide coverage over different types of malware.
For this reason, we select keywords from three categories:
(a) malware and security related keywords, such as malware
and virus, (b) malware type names, such as ransomware and
keylogger, and (c) popular malware names, such as mirai. Due
to space limitations, we will provide the full list of keywords
in our website at publication time for repeatability purposes.
We define three sets of keywords that we use to query
GitHub. The reason is that we want to assess the sensitivity of
the number of keywords on the outcome. Specifically, we use
the following query sets: (a) the Q1 set, which only contains
the keyword “malware"; (b) the Q50 set, which contains 50
keywords, and (c) the Q137 set which contains 137 keywords.
The Q137 keyword set is a super-set of Q50, and Q50 is a
superset of Q1. As we will see below, using the query set Q137
provides wider coverage, and we recommend in practice. We
use the other two to assess the sensitivity of the results in the
initial set of keywords. We list our datasets in Table 1.
B. Retrieving related repositories: Using the Search API,
we query GitHub with our set of keywords. Specifically, we
query GitHub with every keyword in our set separately. In an
ideal world, this would have been enough to collect all related
repositories: a query with “malware" (Q1) should return the
many thousands related repositories, but this is not the case.
The search capability hides several subtleties and limita-
tions. First, there is a limit of 1000 repositories that a single
search can return: we get the top 1000 repositories ordered
by relevancy to the query. Second, the GitHub API allows 30
requests per minute for an authenticated user and 10 requests
per minute for an unauthenticated user.
Bypassing the API limitations. We were able to find a
work around for the first limitation by using ranking option.
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Labeled Dataset Malware Repo. Benign Repo.
LD137 313 566
LD50 326 429
LD1 186 193
Table 2: Our groundtruth: labeled datasets for each of the
three queries, for a total of 2013 repositories.
Namely, a user can specify her preferred ranking order for the
results based on: (a) best match, (b) most stars, (c) fewest stars,
(d) most forks, (e) fewest forks, (f) most recently updated, and
(g) the least recently updated order. By repeating a query
with all these seven ranking options, we can maximize the
number of distinct repositories that we get. This way, for
each keyword in our set, we search with these seven different
ranking preferences to obtain a list of GitHub repositories.
C. Collecting the repositories: We download all the repos-
itories identified in our queries using PyGithub [50], and
we obtain three sets of repositories RD1, RD50 and RD137.
These retrieved datasets have the same "subset" relationship
that they query sets have: RD1 ⊂ RD50 ⊂ RD137. Note that
we remove pathological repositories, mainly repositories with
no actual content, or repositories "deleted" by GitHub. For
each repository, we collect and store: (a) repository-specific
information, (b) author-specific information, and (c) all the
code within the repository.
As we see from Table 1, using more and specialized
malware keywords returns significantly more repositories.
Namely, searching with the keyword “malware" does return
2775 repositories, but searching with the Q50 and Q137 re-
turns 14332 and 97375 repositories respectively.
D. Establishing the groundtruth: As there was no avail-
able groundtruth, we needed to establish our own. As this is
a fairly technical task, we opted for domain experts instead
of Mechanical Turk users, as recommended by recent stud-
ies [22]. We use three computer scientists to manually label
1000 repositories, which we selected in a uniformly random
fashion, from each of our dataset RD137 and RD50 and 600
repositories from RD1. The judges were instructed to inde-
pendently investigate every repository thoroughly.
Ensuring the quality of the groundtruth. To increase the
reliability of our groundtruth, we took the following measures.
First, we asked judges to label a repository only, if they were
certain that it is malicious or benign and distinct, and leave it
unlabeled otherwise. We only kept the repositories for which
the judges agreed unanimously. Second, duplicate repositories
were removed via manual inspection, and were excluded from
the final labeled dataset to avoid overfitting. It is worth noting
that we only found very few duplicates in the order of 3-5 in
each dataset with hundreds of repositories.
With this process, we establish three separate labeled
datasets named LD137, LD50, and LD1 starting from the
respective malware repositories from each of our queries, as
shown in Table 2. Although the labeled datasets are not 50-
50, they are representing both classes reasonably well, so
that a naive solution that will label everything as one class,
would perform poorly. By contrast, our approach performs
sufficiently well, as we will see in Section 5.
As there is no available dataset, we argue that we make a
sufficient size dataset by manual effort.
4 Overview of our Identification Approach
Here, we describe our supervised learning algorithm to iden-
tify the repositories that contain malware.
Step 1. Data preprocessing: As in any Natural Language
Processing (NLP) method, we start with some initial process-
ing of the text to improve the effectiveness of the solution.
We briefly outline three levels of processing functionality.
a. Character level preprocessing: We handle the char-
acter level “noise" by removing special characters, such as
punctuation and currency symbols, and fix Unicode and other
encoding issues.
b. Word level preprocessing: We eliminate or aggregate
words following the best practices of Natural Language Pro-
cessing [32]. First, we remove article words and other words
that don’t carry significant meaning on their own. Second, we
use a stemming technique to handle inflected words. Namely,
we want to decrease the dimensionality of the data by group-
ing words with the same "root". For example, we group the
words “organizing”, “organized”, “organize” and “organizes”
to one word “organize”. Third, we filter out common file and
folder names that we do not expect to help in our classification,
such as “LEGAL”, “LICENSE”, “gitattributes” etc.
c. Entity level filtering: We filter entities that are likely
not helpful in describing the scope of a repository. Specifi-
cally, we remove numbers, URLs, and emails, which are often
found in the text. We found that this filtering improved the
classification performance. In the future, we could consider
mining URLs and other information, such as names of people,
companies or youtube channels, to identify authors, verify
intention, and find more malware activities.
Step 2. The repository fields: We consider fields from the
repositories that can be numbers or text. Text-based fields
require processing in order to turn them into classification
features and we explain this below. We use and evaluate the
following text fields: title, description, topics, file and folder
names and README file fields.
Text field representation: We consider two techniques to
represent each text field by a feature in the classification.
i. Bag of Words (BoW): The bag-of-words (BoW) model
is among the most widely used representations of a document.
The document is represented as the number of occurrences of
its words, disregarding grammar and word order [69]. This
model is commonly used in document classification where the
frequency of each word is used as feature value for training
a classifier [41]. We use the model with the count vectorizer
and TF-IDF vectorizer to create the feature vector.
In more detail, we represent each text field in the repository
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with a vector V [K], where V [i] corresponds to the significance
of work i for the text. There are several ways to assign val-
ues V [i]: (a) zero-one to account for presence, (b) number
of occurrences, and (c) the TF-IDF value of the word. We
evaluated all the above methods.
Fixing the number of words per field. To improve the ef-
fectiveness of our approach using BoW, we conduct a feature
selection process, χ2 statistic following best practices [53].
The χ2 statistic measures the lack of independence between a
word (feature) and a class. A feature with lower chi-square
score is less informative for that class, and thus not useful in
the classification. We discuss this further in Section 5. For
each text-based field f , we select the top K f words for that
field, which exhibit the highest discerning power in identi-
fying malware repositories. Note that we set a value for K f
during the training stage For each field, we select the value
K f , as we explain in Section 5.
ii. Word embedding: The word embedding model is a
vector representations of each word in a document: each word
is mapped to an M-dimensional vector of real numbers [43],
or equivalently are projected in an M-dimensional space. A
good embedding ensures that words that are close in meaning
have nearby representations in the embedded space. In order
to create the document vector, word embedding follows two
approaches (i) frequency-based vectorizer(unsupervised) [55]
and (ii) content-based vectorizer(supervised) [37]. Note that
in this type of representation, we do not use the word level
processing, which we described in the previous step, since
this method can leverage contextual information.
We use frequency-based word embedding with word aver-
age and TF-IDF vectorizer. We also use pre-trained model of
Google word2vec [42] and Stanford (Glov) [?] to create the
feature vector.
Finally, we create the vector of the repository by concate-
nating the vectors of each field of that repository.
Step 3. Selecting the fields: Another key question is which
fields from the repository to use in our classification. We
experiment with all of the fields listed in Section 2 and we
explain our findings in the next Section.
Step 4. Selecting a ML engine: We design classifiers to
classify the repositories into two classes: (i) malware repos-
itory and (ii) benign repository. We systematically evaluate
many machine learning algorithms [7,44]: Naive Bayes (NB),
Logistic Regression (LR), Decision Tree (CART), Random
Forest(RF), K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN), Linear Discriminant
Analysis (LDA), and Support Vector Machine (SVM).
Step 5. Detecting source code repositories: We also want
to identify the existence of source code in the repositories,
as the final step in providing malware source code to the
community.
We propose a heuristic approach, which seems to work
fairly well in practice. First, we want to identify files in the
repository that contain source code. To do this, we start by
examining their file extension. If the file extension is one of
the known programming languages: Assembly, C/C++, Batch
File, Bash Shell Script, Power Shell script, Java, Python, C#,
Objective-C, Pascal, Visual Basic, Matlab, PHP, Javascript,
and Go, we label it as a source file. Second, if the number of
source files in a repository exceeds the Source Percentage
threshold (SourceThresh), we consider that the repository
contains source code.
How effective is this heuristic? It turns out that in practice
it works pretty well, as we will see in Section 5. Given that
authors go out of their way to share their malware openly,
and even provide appropriate titles and keywords, it seems
less likely that they will attempt to obfuscate the existence of
source code in the repository.
5 Evaluation: Choices and Results
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the classifica-
tion based on the proposed methodology defined in Section 4.
More specifically, our goal here is to answer the following
questions:
1. Repository Field Selection: Which repository fields
should we consider in our analysis?
2. Field Representation: Which feature representation is
better between bag of words (BoW) and word embed-
dings and considering several versions of each?
3. Feature Selection: What are the most informative fea-
tures in identifying malware repositories?
4. ML Algorithm Selection: Which ML algorithm ex-
hibits the best performance?
5. Classification Effectiveness: What is the precision, re-
call and F1-score of the classification?
6. Identifying Malware Repositories: How many mal-
ware repositories do we find?
7. Identifying Malware Source Code Repository: How
many of the malware repositories have source code?
Note that we have a fairly complex task: we want to iden-
tify the best fields, representation method and Machine Learn-
ing engine, while considering different values for parameters.
What complicates matters is that all these selections are in-
terdependent. We present our analysis in sequence, but we
followed many trial and error and non-linear paths in reality.
1. Selecting repository fields: We evaluated all the repos-
itory fields mentioned earlier. In fact, we used a significant
number of experiments with different subsets of the features,
not shown here due to space limitations. We find that the title,
description, topics, README file, and file and folder names
have the most discerning power. We also considered number
of forks, watchers, and stars of the repository and the number
of followers and followings of the author of the repository.
We found that not only it did not help, but it usually decreased
the classification accuracy by 2-3%. One possible explanation
is that the numbers of forks, stars and followers reflect the
popularity rather than the content of a repository.
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Representation Classification
Accuracy
Range
Bag of Words with Count Vectorizer 86%-51%
Bag of Words with Count Vectorizer + Feature
Selection
91%-56%
Bag of Words with TF-IDF vectorizer 82%-63%
Word Embedding with Word Average 85%-72%
Word Embedding with TF-IDF 85%-74%
Pretrained Google word2vec Model 76%-64%
Pretrained Stanford (Glov) Model 73%-62%
Table 3: Selecting the feature representation model: We eval-
uate all the representations across seven machine learning
approaches and report the range of the overall classification
accuracy.
2. Selecting a field representation: The goal is to find,
which representation approach works better. In Table 3, we
show the comparison of the range of classification accuracy
across the 7 different ML algorithms that we will also consider
below. We find that Bag of Words with the count vectorizer
representation reaches 86% classification accuracy, with the
word embedding approach nearly matches that with 85% accu-
racy. Note that we finetune the selection of words to represent
each field in the next step.
Why does not the embedding approach outperform the
bag of words? One would have expected that the most com-
plex embedding approach would have been the winner and
with a significant margin. We attribute this to the relatively
small text size in most text fields, which also do not provide
well-structured sentences (think two-three words for the ti-
tle, and isolated words for the topics). Furthermore, the word
co-occurrences does not exist in topics and file names field,
which partly what makes embedding approaches work well
in large and well structured documents [25, 40].
In the rest of this paper, we choose the Bag of Words with
count vectorizer to represent our text fields, since it exhibits
good performance and is computationally less intensive than
the embedding method.
3. Fixing the number of words per field. We want to
identify the most discerning words from each text field, which
is a standard process in NLP for improving the scalability,
efficiency and accuracy of a text classifier [12]. Using the χ2
statistic, we select the top K f best words from each field.
To select the appropriate number of words per field, we
followed the process below. We vary K f = 5,10,20,30,40 and
50 for title, topic and README file, and we find that the top
30 words in title, 10 words in topic and 10 words in README
file exhibit the highest accuracy. Similarly, we try K f = 80,
90, 100, 110 and 120 for file names and K f = 300, 325, 350,
375, 400, 425, 450 and 475 for the description field. We find
that the top 100 words for file and folder names and top 400
words for description field give the highest accuracy. Note
that we do this during training and refining the algorithm, and
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Figure 2: Naive Bayes tops by performance (Accuracy, Preci-
sion, Recall and F1-score) comparison among NB, LR, CART,
RF, KNN, LDA and SVM on dataset LD137.
then we continue to use these words as features in testing.
Thus, we select the top: (a) 30 words from the title, (b) 10
words from the topics, (c) 400 words from the description,
(d) 100 words from the file names, and 10 words from the
README file. This leads to a total of 550 words across
all fields. For reference, we find 9253 unique words in the
repository fields of our training dataset. Reducing the focus
on the top 550 most discerning words per field increases the
classification accuracy by as much as 20% in some cases.
4. Evaluating and selecting ML algorithms: We asses
the classification performance of Multinomial Naive Bayes
(NB), Logistic Regression (LR), Support Vector Machine
(SVM), Decision Tree (CART), Random Forest(RF), Lin-
ear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), and K-Nearest-Neighbors
(KNN), and show their precision, recall and F1-score in Fig-
ure 2.
Multinomial Naive Bayes exhibits the best F1-score with
87%, striking a good balance between 89% precision, 86%
recall for the malware class. Detecting the benign class we do
even better with 92% precision, 94% recall and 93% F1-score.
By contrast, the F1-score of the other algorithms is below
79%. Note that KNN, LR and LDA provide higher precision,
but with significantly lower recall. Clearly, one could use
these algorithms to get higher precision at the cost of lower
total number of repositories.
We use Multinomial Naive Bayes as our classification en-
gine for the rest of this study. We attempt to explain the
superior F1-Score of the Naive Bayes in our context. The
main advantage of Naive Bayes over other algorithms is that
it considers the features independently of each other and can
handle large number of features better. As a result, it is more
robust to noisy or unreliable features. It also performs well in
domains with many equally important features, where other
approaches suffer, especially with a small training data, and
it is not prone to overfitting [59]. As a result, the Naive Bayes
is considered a dependable algorithm for text classification
and it is often used as the benchmark to beat [66].
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Figure 3: Assessing the effect of the number of keywords in
the query: Precision, Recall and F1-score of our approach on
the LD137, LD50 and LD1 labeled datasets.
Dataset Initial Malware Mal. + Source
RD1 2775 809 680
RD50 14332 3615 3096
RD137 97375 8644 7504
Table 4: The identified repositories per dataset with: (a) mal-
ware, and (b) malware and source code.
5. Assessing the effect of the query set: We have made
the following choices in the previous steps: (a) 5 text-based
fields, (b) bag of words with count vectorization, (c) 550 total
words across all the fields, and (d) the Multinomial Naive
Bayes. We perform 10-fold cross validation and report the
precision, recall and F1-score in Figure 3 for our three differ-
ent labeled data sets. We see that the precision stays above
89% for all three datasets, with a recall above 77%.
It is worth noting the relative stability of our approach
with respect to the keyword set for the initial query especially
between LD50 and LD137 datasets. The LD1 dataset we
observe higher accuracy, but significantly less recall compared
to LD137. We attribute this fact to the single keyword used in
selecting the repositories in LD1, which may have lead to a
more homogeneous group of repositories. Interestingly, LD50
seem to have the lower recall and F1-score even though the
differences are not that large.
6. Identifying 8644 malware repositories: We use
LD137 to train our Multinomial Naive Bayes model and apply
it on RD137 dataset. We find 8644 malware repositories. We
also apply the same trained model on RD1 and RD50 and
find 809 and 3615 malware repositories respectively, but this
repositories are included in the 8644. (Recall that RD1 and
RD50 are subsets of RD137).
7. Identifying 7504 malware source code repositories:
We use our heuristic approach to identify source code reposi-
tories. We set our Source Percentage threshold to 75%, mean-
ing that: if more than 75% of files in a repository are source
code files, we label it as a source code repository. Applying
this heuristic, we find that 7504 repositories are most likely
source code repositories in RD137. We use the name M137
to refer to this group of malware source code repositories. We
find 680 and 3096 malware source code repositories in RD1
and RD50 as shown in Table 4. However, these are subset of
M137, given that RD1 and RD50 are subsets of RD137.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our heuristic, we manu-
ally check 30 randomly-selected repositories from M137. We
find that all 30 repositories contain source code1, which cor-
responds to 100% precision. We will further evaluate the
effectiveness of this heuristic in the future.
8. A curated malware source code dataset: MCur As
a tangible contribution, we provide, MCur, a dataset of 250
repositories from the M137 dataset, which we manually verify
for containing malware source code and relating to a partic-
ular malware type. Opting for diversity and coverage, the
dataset spans all the identified types: virus, backdoor, bot-
net, keylogger, worm, ransomware, rootkit, trojan, spyware,
spoof, ddos, sniff, spam, and cryptominer. While constantly
updating, we will make this dataset available to researchers.
6 A large scale study of malware
Encouraged by the substantial number of malware reposito-
ries, we study the distributions and longitudinal properties of
the identified malware repositories in M137.
Caveat: We provide some key observations in this sec-
tion, but they should be viewed as indicative and approximate
trends and only within the context of the collected reposito-
ries and with the general assumption that repository titles and
descriptions are reasonably accurate. In Section 8, we discuss
issues around the biases and limitations that our dataset may
introduce.
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Figure 4: CCDF distributions of forks, stars and watchers per
repository.
A. Identifying influential repositories. The prominence
of a repository can be measured by the number of forks, stars,
1Apart from a manual verification, these 30 repositories were further
stress-tested: (a) 20 where used in a separate static analysis study, and (b) 15
were compiled and run successfully within an emulator.
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ID
Author #
Star
#
Fork
#
Watcher
Content of the Reposi-
tory
1 ytisf 4851 1393 730 80 malware source code
and 140 Binaries
2 n1nj4sec 4811 1307 440 Pupy RAT
3 Screetsec 3010 1135 380 TheFatRat Backdoor
4 malwaredllc 2515 513 268 Byob botnet
5 RoganDawes 2515 513 268 USB attack platform
6 Visgean 626 599 127 Zeus trojan horse
7 Ramadhan 535 283 22 30 malware samples
8 dana-at-cp 1320 513 125 backdoor-apk backdoor
Table 5: The profile of the top 5 most influential malware
repositories across all three metrics with 8 unique repositories.
and watchers. In Figure 4, we plot the complementary cumu-
lative distribution function (CCDF) of these three metrics for
our malware repositories.
Fork distribution: We find that 2% of the repositories
seem quite influential with at least 100 forks as shown in
Figure 4. Recall that the fork counter indicates the number
of distinct users that have forked a repository. For reference,
78% of the repositories have less than 2 forks.
Star distribution: We find that 2% of the repositories re-
ceive more than 250 stars as shown in Figure 4. For reference,
75% of the repositories have less than 3 stars.
Watcher distribution: In Figure 4, we find that 1% of the
repositories have more than 50 watchers. For reference, we
observe that 84% of the repositories have less than 3 watchers.
Note that these distributions are skewed, and follow patterns
that can be approximated by a log-normal distribution.
Which are the most influential repositories? We find that 8
repositories dominate the top 5 spots across all three metrics:
stars, forks, and watchers. We present a short profile of these
dominant repositories in Table 5. Most of the repositories
contain a single malware project, which is an established
practice among the authors in GitHub [48,61]. We find that the
repository “theZoo” [46], created by ytisf in 2014 is the most
forked, watched, and starred repository with 1393 forks, 730
watchers and 4851 stars as of October, 2019. However, this
repository is quite unique and was created with the intention
of being a malware database with 140 binaries and 80 source
code repositories.
Influence metrics are correlated: As one would expect,
the influence and popularity metrics are correlated. We use
a common correlation metric, the Pearson Correlation Coef-
ficient (r) [6], measured in a scale of [−1,1]. We calculate
the metric for all pairs of our three popularity metrics. We
find that all of them exhibit higher positive correlation: stars
vs. forks (r = 0.92, p < 0.01), forks vs. watchers (r = 0.91,
p < 0.01) and watchers vs. stars (r = 0.91, p < 0.01).
B. Malware Type and Target Platform. We wanted to
get a feel for what type of malware we have identified. As a
first approximation, we use the keywords found in the text
fields to relate repositories in M137 with the type of malware
Types Target PlatformWind. Linux Mac IoT Andr. iOS Total
Total 1592 1365 380 108 442 131 4018
key-
logger
396 209 42 2 27 3 679
back-
door
181 227 37 11 51 4 511
virus 235 131 34 2 51 16 469
botnet 153 154 43 36 64 17 467
trojan 133 70 24 16 67 19 329
spoof 76 115 88 2 20 9 310
rootkit 55 163 13 2 19 3 255
ransom-
ware
117 67 14 1 33 13 245
ddos 71 95 20 10 9 3 208
worm 61 45 18 5 25 18 172
spyware 45 22 6 6 38 16 133
spam 40 29 18 14 23 5 129
sniff 29 38 23 1 15 5 111
Table 6: Distribution of the malware repositories from M137
dataset based on the malware type and malware target plat-
form. This table demonstrates the repositories that fit with the
criteria defined in Section 6.
and the intended target platform. Our goal is to create the
two-dimensional distribution per malware type and the target
platform as shown in Table 6. To create this table, we associate
a repository with keywords in its title, topics, descriptions, file
names and README file fields of: (a) the 6 target platforms,
and (b) the 13 malware type keywords.
How well does this heuristic approach work? We provide
two different indications of its relative effectiveness. First,
the vast majority of the repositories relate to one platform or
type of malware: (a) less than 8% relate to more than one
platform, and (b) less than 11% relate to more than one type
of malware. Second, we manually verify the 250 repositories
in our curated data MCur and find a 98% accuracy.
Below, we provide some observations from Table 6.
a. Keyloggers reign supreme. We see that one of the
largest categories is the keylogger malware with 679 reposi-
tories, which are mostly affiliated with Windows and Linux
platforms. We discuss the emergence of keyloggers below in
our temporal analysis.
b. Windows and Linux are the most popular targets.
Not surprisingly, we find that the majority of the malware
repositories are affiliated with these two platforms: 1592
repositories for Windows, and 1365 for Linux.
c. MacOS-focused repositories: fewer, but they exist.
Although MacOS platform are less common among PC users,
we see that malware repositories targeting such platforms
indeed exist. As shown in Figure 5c, MacOS malware reposi-
tories are an order of magnitude less compared to those for
Windows and Linux.
C. Temporal analysis. We want to study the evolution and
the trends of malware repositories. We plot the number of
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Figure 5: New malware repositories per year: a) all malware, b) per type of malware, and c) per target platform.
new malware repositories per year: a) total malware, b) per
type of malware, and c) per target platform in Figure 5. We
discuss a few interesting temporal behaviors below.
a. The number of new malware repositories more than
triples every four years. We see an alarming increase from
117 malware repositories in 2010 to 620 repositories in 2014
and to 2166 repositories in 2018. We also observe a sharp
increase of 70% between 2015 to 2016 shown in Figure 5a.
b. Keyloggers started a super-linear growth since 2010
and are by far affiliated with the most new repositories per
year since 2013, but their rate of growth reduced in 2018.
c. Ransomware repositories emerge in 2014 and gain
momentum in 2017. Ransomware experienced their highest
growth rate in 2017 with 155 new repositories, while that
number dropped to 103 in 2018.
d. Malware activity slowed down in 2018 across the
board. It seems that 2018 is a slower year for all malware
even when seen by type ( Figure 5b) and target platform (Fig-
ure 5c). We find that the number of new malware repositories
has dropped significantly in 2018 for most types of malware
except virus, keylogger and trojan.
e. IoT and iPhone malware repositories become more
visible after 2014. We find that IoT malware emerges in 2015
and iPhone malware sees an increase after 2014 in Figure 5c.
We conjecture that this is possibly encouraged by the emer-
gence and increasing popularity of specific malware: (a) Wire-
Lurker, Masque, AppBuyer malware [13] for iPhones, and
(b) BASHLITE [65], a Linux based botnet for IoT devices.
We find the names of the aferemntioned malware in many
repositories starting in 2014. Interestingly, the source code
of the original BASHLITE botnet is available in a repository
created by anthonygtellez in 2015.
f. Windows and Linux: dominant but slowing down. In
Figure 5c, we see that windows and linux malware are flat-
tened between 2017 and 2018. By contrast, IoT and android
repositories have increased.
7 Understanding malware authors
Intrigued by the fact that authors create public malware repos-
itories, we attempt to understand and profile their behavior.
As a first step towards understanding the malware authors,
we want to assess their popularity and influence. We use the
following metrics: (a) number of malware repositories which
they created, (b) number of followers, (c) total number of
watchers on their repositories, and (d) total number of stars.
We focus on the first two metrics here. We use the notation
top k authors for any of the metrics above, where k can be
any positive integer to referring to "heavy-hitters".
A. Finding influential malware authors. We study the
distribution of the number of malware repositories created
and the number followers per author in following.
First, we find that 15 authors are contributing roughly 5%
of all malware repositories by examining the CCDF of the
created repositories in Figure 6. From the figure, we find an
outlier author, cyberthreats, who doesn’t follow power law
distribution [20], has created 336 malware repositories. We
also find that 99% authors have less than 5 repositories.
Second, we study the distribution of the number of follow-
ers per author but omit the plot due to space limitations. The
distributions is skewed with 3% (221) of the authors having
more than 300 followers each, while 70% of the authors have
less than 16 followers.
B. Malware authors strive for an online “brand": In an
effort to understand the motive of sharing malware reposito-
ries, we make the following investigation.
a. Usernames seem persistent across online platforms.
We find that many malware authors use the same username
consistently across many online platforms, such as security
forums. We conjecture that they are developing a reputation
and they use their username as a “unique" identifier.
We identify 18 malware authors2, who are active in at least
2 Note that this does not mean that the other authors are not doing the
same, but they could be active in other security forums or online platforms.
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Figure 6: CCDF of malware repositories per author.
one of the three security forums: Offensive Community, Ethi-
cal Hacker and Hack This Site, for which we happen to have
access to their data. We conjecture that at least some of these
usernames correspond to the same users based on the follow-
ing two indications. First, we find direct connections between
the usernames across different platforms. For example, user
3vilp4wn at the “Hack This Site” forum is promoting a key-
logger malware by referring to a GitHub repository [1] whose
author has the same username. Second, these usernames are
fairly uncommon, which increases the likelihood of belong-
ing to the same person. For example, there is a GitHub user
with the name fahimmagsi, and someone with the same user-
name is boasting about their hacking successes in the “Ethical
Hacker” forum. As we will see below, fahimmagsi seems to
have a well-established online reputation.
b. “Googling" usernames reveals significant hacking
activities. Given that these GitHub usernames are fairly
unique, it was natural to look them up on the web at large.
Even a simple Internet search with the usernames reveals
significant hacking activities, including hacking websites or
social networks, and offering hacking tutorials in YouTube.
We investigate the top 40 most prolific malware authors
using a web search with a single simple query: “hacked by
<username>”. We then examine only the first page of search
results. Despite all these self-imposed restrictions, we identify
three users with substantial hacking related activities across
Internet. For example, we find a number of news articles for
hacking a series of websites by GitHub users fahimmagsi and
CR4SH [60] [15]. Moreover, we find user n1nj4sec sharing a
multi-functional Remote Access Trojan (RAT) named “Pupy",
developed by her, which received significant news coverage
in security articles back in March of 2019 [45] [52]. We are
confident that well-crafted and targeted searches can connect
more malware authors with hacking activities and usernames
in other online forums.
8 Discussion
We discuss the effectiveness and limitations of SourceFinder.
a. Why is malware publicly available in the first place?
Our investigation in Section 7 provides strong indications
that malware authors want to actively establish their hacking
reputation. It seems that they want to boost their online credi-
bility, which often translates to money. Recent works [?, ?, ?]
study the underground markets of malware services and tools:
it stands to reason that notorious hackers will attract more
clients. At the same time, GitHub acts as a collaboration plat-
form, which can help hackers improve their tools.
b. Do we identify every malware repository in GitHub?
Our tool can not guarantee that it will identify every malware
repository in GitHub. First, we can only identify reposito-
ries that “want to be found": (a) they must be public, and
(b) they must be described with the appropriate text and key-
words. Clearly, if the author wants to hide her repository, we
won’t be able to find it. However, we argue that this defeats
the purpose of having a public archive: if secrecy was de-
sired, the code would have been shared through private links
and services. Second, our approach is constrained by GitHub
querying limitations, which we discussed in Section 3, and the
set of 137 keywords that we use. However, we are encouraged
by the number and the reasonable diversity of the retrieved
repositories we see in Table 6.
c. Are our datasets representative? This is the typical
hard question for any measurement or data collection study.
First of all, we want to clarify that our goal is to create a large
database of malware source code. So, in that regard, we claim
that we accomplished our mission. At the same time, we seem
to have a fair number of malware samples in each category of
interest, as we see in Table 6.
Studying the trends of malware is a distant second goal,
which we present with the appropriate caveat. On the one
hand, we are limited by GitHub’s API operation, as we dis-
cussed earlier. On the other hand, we attempt to reduce the
biases that are under our control. To ensure some diversity
among our malware, we added as many words as we could
in our 137 malware, which is likely to capture a wide range
of malware types. We argue that the fairly wide breadth of
malware types in Table 6 is a good indication. Note that our
curated dataset MCur with 250 malware is reasonably repre-
sentative in terms of coverage.
d. What is the overlap among the identified reposito-
ries? Note that our repository does not include forked reposi-
tories, since GitHub does not return forked repositories as
answers to a query. Similarly, the breadth of the types of the
malware as shown in Table 6 hints at a reasonable diversity.
However, our tool cannot claim that the identified repositories
are distinct nor is it attempting do so. GitHub does not restrict
authors from copying (downloading), and uploading it as a
new repository. In the future, we intend to study the similarity
and evolution among these repositories.
e. Are the authors of repositories the original creator
of the source code? This is an interesting and complex ques-
tion that goes beyond the scope of this work. Identifying the
original creator will require studying the source code of all
related repositories, and analyzing the dynamics of the hacker
authors, which we intend to do in the future.
f. Are all the malware authors malicious? Not necessar-
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ily. This is an interesting question, but it is not central to the
main point of our work. On the one hand, we find some white
hackers or researchers, such as Yuval Nativ [68], or Nicolas
Verdier [47]. On the other hand, several authors seem to be
malicious, as we saw in Section 7.
g. Are our malware repositories in "working order"?
It is hard to know for sure, but we attempt to answer indi-
rectly. First, we pick 30 malware source codes and all of them
compiled and a subset of 15 of them actually run successfully
in an emulated environment as we already mentioned. Sec-
ond, these public repositories are a showcase for the skills of
the author, who will be reluctant to have repositories of low
quality. Third, public repositories, especially popular ones,
are inevitably scrutinized by their followers.
h. Can we handle evasion efforts? Our goal is to create
the largest malware source-code database possible and having
collected 7504 malware repositories seems like a great start.
In the future, malware authors could obfuscate their reposi-
tories by using misleading titles, and description, and even
filenames. We argue that authors seem to want their reposito-
ries to be found, which is why they are public. We also have
to be clear: it is easy for the authors to hide their repositories,
and they could would start by making them private or avoid
GitHub altogether. However, both these moves will diminish
the visibility of the authors.
i. Will our approach generalize to other archives? We
believe that SourceFinder can generalize to other archives,
which provide public repositories, like GitLab and BitBucket.
We find that these sites allow public repositories and let the
users retrieve repositories. We have also seen equivalent data
fields (title, description, etc). Therefore, we are confident that
our approach can work with other archives.
9 Related Work
There are several works that attempt to determine if a piece of
software is malware, usually focusing on a binary, using static
or dynamic analysis [4, 17, 35, 57]. However, to the best of
our knowledge, no previous study has focused on identifying
malware source code in public software archives, such as
GitHub, in a systematic manner as we do in this work. We
highlight the related works in the following categories:
a. Studies that needed source code. Several studies [39,
58, 70] use malware source code that are manually retrieved
from GitHub repositories. Some studies [8] [9] compare the
evolution and the code reuse of 150 malware source codes
(with only some from GitHub) with that of benign software
from a software engineering perspective and study the code
reuse. Overall, various studies [21, 30] can benefit from mal-
ware source code to fine-tune their approach.
b. Mining and analyzing GitHub: Many studies have an-
alyzed different aspects of GitHub, but not with the intention
of retrieving malware repositories. First, there are efforts that
study the user interactions and collaborations on GitHub and
their relationship to other social media in [28,36,49]. Second,
some efforts discuss the challenges in extracting and analyz-
ing data from GitHub with respect to sampling biases [14,26].
Other works [33, 34] study how users utilize the various fea-
tures and functions of GitHub. Several studies [29,51,63] dis-
cuss the challenges of mining software archives, like Source-
Forge and GitHub, arguing that more information is required
to make assertions about users and software projects.
c. Databases of malware source code: At the time of writ-
ing this paper, there are few malware source code databases
and are rarely updated such as project theZoo [46]. To the
best of our knowledge, there does not exist an active archive
of malware source code, where malware research community
can get an enough number of source code to analyze.
d. Database of malware binaries: There are well estab-
lished malware binary collection initiatives, such as Virus-
total [62] which provides analysis result for a malware bi-
nary. There are also community based projects such as Virus-
Bay [64] that serve as malware binary sharing platform.
e. Converting binaries to source code: A complementary
approach is to try to generate the source code from the binary,
but this is a very hard task. Some works [18, 19] focus on
reverse engineering of the malware binary to a high-level
language representation, but not source code. Some other ef-
forts [11,27,56] introduce binary decompilation into readable
source code. However, malware authors use sophisticated
obfuscation techniques [54] [10, 67] to make it difficult to
reverse engineer a binary into source code.
f. Measuring and modeling hacking activity. Some other
studies analyze the underground black market of hacking
activities but their starting point is security forums [?, ?, ?],
and as such they study the dynamics of that community but
without retrieving any malware code.
10 Conclusion
Our work capitalizes on a great missed opportunity: there are
thousands of malware source code repositories on GitHub.
At the same time, there is a scarcity of malware source code,
which is necessary for certain research studies.
Our work is arguably the first to develop a systematic ap-
proach to extract malware source-code repositories at scale
from GitHub. Our work provides two main tangible outcomes:
(a) we develop SourceFinder, which identifies malware repos-
itories with 89% precision, and (b) we create, possibly, the
largest non-commercial malware source code archive with
7504 repositories. Our large scale study provide some interest-
ing trends for both the malware repositories and the dynamics
of the malware authors.
We intend to open-source both SourceFinder and the
database of malware source code to maximize the impact of
our work. Our ambitious vision is to become the authoritative
source for malware source code for the research community
by providing tools, databases, and benchmarks.
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